In Heather Douglas’s Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal (you can find a video of Douglas speaking about her book here), she claims that there is no practical way to draw a distinction between scientists-as-scientists and scientists-as-advisors. That is, you cannot cleanly separate the descriptive, empirical claims of scientists from their prescriptive advice. Mainstream philosophy of science, she claims, has gone astray since the 1940s in supporting a view of science as value-free, and scientists as detached and objective. Douglas not only argues that we need to acknowledge the unavoidable value-ladenness of science, but that values are not necessarily a negative influence on science. Rather, scientists have an ethical obligation to make value judgments in their work.
Here is one of her examples:
Suppose a scientist is examining epidemiological records in conjunction with air quality standards and the scientist notices that a particular pollutant is always conjoined with a spike in respiratory deaths. Suppose that this pollutant is cheap to control or eliminate (a new and simple technology has just been developed). Should the scientist make the empirical claim (or, if on a science advisory panel reviewing this evidence, support the claim) that this pollutant is a public health threat? Certainly, there is uncertainty in the empirical evidence here. Epidemiological records are always fraught with problems of reliability, and indeed, we have only a correlation between the pollutant and the health effect. The scientist, in being honest, should undoubtedly acknowledge these uncertainties. To pretend certainty on such evidence would be dishonest and deceptive. But the scientist can also choose whether or not the emphasize the importance of the uncertainties (81).
Douglas presents this as a slam-dunk case, and has constructed the situation, by assuming a cheap and easy fix, to be unproblematic. However, I find the implications of this argument deeply troubling.
At least since Kuhn, philosophers of science have acknowledged that all of us, including scientists, are, to some degree, trapped by our prior values and beliefs. Our observation of the world is “theory laden”: what we see is influenced by what we believe. Two observers with different beliefs may observe the same scene but come to different conclusions about what has been observed. However, Douglas is taking this commonly accepted view one step further: she is advocating that scientists make choices about how to report their results based on their values. The scientist in this situation is not forced by psychology into forming a belief about the threat of this pollutant based on her belief, but is making a conscious, unforced decision about how to report that belief to the public and policymakers. There is even a potential double-whammy here, as the scientist’s values first unconsciously affect her interpretation of the data, and then consciously affect how she reports that data.
It seems worth asking what is at stake in this example. What should the scientist do if she had no idea how difficult or expensive the problem would be to solve? Would the scientist be unable to make an empirical claim in that case? It seems unlikely. If the scientist would be able to function in this alternative situation, then why cannot, or why should not, the scientist make a report that ignores such information and allows the public and policymakers to decide how to act? What authorizes the scientist to make theses decisions on the public’s behalf?
The scientist in this situation ... is making a conscious, unforced decision about how to report that belief to the public and policymakers. Yes and no. The scientist isn't forced to accept or make any *particular* claim. But the scientist *is* forced to make *some* claim: that the pollutant i...
The scientist in this situation … is making a conscious, unforced decision about how to report that belief to the public and policymakers.
Yes and no. The scientist isn’t forced to accept or make any *particular* claim. But the scientist *is* forced to make *some* claim: that the pollutant is likely to cause respiratory disease, that the pollutant is unlikely to cause respiratory disease, that there are important certainties but the pollutant is somewhat likely to cause respiratory disease, or similar. Even shrugging her shoulders and saying we need to do more research is making a claim: that there’s some reason to be concerned, but not enough (or strong enough) for public policy. If scientists did’t have to tell policymakers something, then they could just point to the uncertainties and do more research. But they do have to tell policymakers something, and it’s the need to make an epistemic decision under uncertainty that requires, on Douglas’ view, the appeal to values.
What should the scientist do if she had no idea how difficult or expensive the problem would be to solve? Would the scientist be unable to make an empirical claim in that case?
The harmful consequences of accepting the hypothesis are only some of the things scientists ought to take into account. They also ought to take into account the harmful consequences of *rejecting* the hypothesis. In this example, those are measured in incidents of respiratory disease and perhaps unnecessary death. If the scientist has no idea whatsoever about how to weigh the economic risks against the risks of respiratory disease, then no, she can’t make the claim. (I think Douglas’ model does an excellent job of explaining why environmentalists and industry scientists frequently disagree about what the `evidence tells us’.)
Why is certainty relevant to the issue? Aren't those committed to the notion of value-free science committed to the notion that a scientist should never report any public health threat? Because the very notion of "public health threat" is inherently value-laden? Certainty doesn't enter into it at...
Why is certainty relevant to the issue? Aren’t those committed to the notion of value-free science committed to the notion that a scientist should never report any public health threat? Because the very notion of “public health threat” is inherently value-laden? Certainty doesn’t enter into it at that level.
Also, I think you set up a straw man here unless the scientists are given power to pass laws or regulate business they have no authority to “make these decisions on the public behalf.” Note that this scientists is on an “advisory board” presumably offering advice to policymakers with real power to accept or ignore the advice.
In this example the scientist is able to "choose whether or not to emphasize the importance of the uncertainties". I take this to mean the scientist has a choice between reporting something like "The data is not completely conclusive, but it certain enough to justify action" vs. "There is too much u...
In this example the scientist is able to “choose whether or not to emphasize the importance of the uncertainties”. I take this to mean the scientist has a choice between reporting something like “The data is not completely conclusive, but it certain enough to justify action” vs. “There is too much uncertainty in the data to justify action”. The scientist is not directly empowered to make a policy decision, but in choosing how to frame her report is able to exert a large influence on what decision is made. I am wondering whether the scientist should (ethically?) make either assertion, or whether the scientist should report her conclusion about the data without offering an opinion on whether it justifies action, leaving that debate up to the public and policymakers.
Mike, Douglas’ example is indeed flawed. But it’s not the ethical supposition that undermines her case, it’s the epistemic problem. Like so many of the scenarios philosophers dream up, hers doesn’t reflect reality. Douglas writes, for example: “Suppose that this pollutant is cheap t...
Mike,
Douglas’ example is indeed flawed. But it’s not the ethical supposition that undermines her case, it’s the epistemic problem. Like so many of the scenarios philosophers dream up, hers doesn’t reflect reality. Douglas writes, for example:
“Suppose that this pollutant is cheap to control or eliminate (a new and simple technology has just been developed).”
Now try to cite a real case where the scientist who identified a potential problem was in a position to judge whether controlling or eliminating it was the right thing to do. The epidemiologists who complained about Bisphenol A, for example, were not also chemical engineers, so they could hardly perform a responsible risk assessment on whether eliminating the chemical was in all our best interests.
The bottom line is that it’s irresponsible for scientists to advocate policy solely on the basis of their particular expertise.
Hello, this is my first comment here on your wonderful blog. I agree with Popper when he says that "it is all guesswork, doxa rather than epistēmē… Science has no authority… It represents…our hope of emancipating ourselves from ignorance and narrow-mindedness, from fear and superstition....
Hello, this is my first comment here on your wonderful blog.
I agree with Popper when he says that “it is all guesswork, doxa rather than epistēmē… Science has no authority… It represents…our hope of emancipating ourselves from ignorance and narrow-mindedness, from fear and superstition. And this includes… the superstitious belief in the authority of science itself.” (Karl Popper in Logic of Scientific Discovery: 1983, 259–260)
This does not mean that scientists have no authority – certainly some have more than others but not because they do this thing called science. I find it helpful to study each case on its own with respect to materialities, norms and discourses.
mh
Mike you raise and interesting question about a book that I have been meaning to read for a while now. Since I have not yet had the pleasure of reading Douglas's book I'll just comment on the one example you point out. As has all been stated above, the example is simplistic and does not represe...
Mike you raise and interesting question about a book that I have been meaning to read for a while now. Since I have not yet had the pleasure of reading Douglas’s book I’ll just comment on the one example you point out.
As has all been stated above, the example is simplistic and does not represent the complexity of science policy in the real world. I, however, see this as even more of a reason for scientists, particularly when acting as advisory role, to act on their beliefs and pressure those with actual power to make decisions. I understand this stance contradicts the ethic of “disinterested” science and that does make me a little uncomfortable. What makes me even more uncomfortable, is the abuse of “scientific debate” and the marginalization of “disinterested scientific” in deeply important debates over world altering realities like Global Warming (see Orskes and Conway Merchants of Doubt). In my view science and technology have become so deeply involved in the process of decision making at every and public debate that adhering to a policy of “disinterestedness” or trying to avoid becoming ethnically involved is simply a recipe for being ignored.